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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model with financial frictions in which internal
capital (equity capital) and external capital (bank loans) have different rates of
return. Financial development raises the rate of return on external capital but has
a non-monotonic effect on the rate of return on internal capital.
We then show in a two-country model that capital account liberalization leads
to outflow of financial capital from the country with less developed financial system.
However, the direction of foreign direct investment (FDI, henceforth) depends on
the exact degrees of financial development in the two countries as well as the specific
capital controls policy.
Our model helps explain the Lucas Paradox (Lucas, 1990). Countries with least
developed financial system have the outflows of both financial capital and FDI;
countries with most developed financial system witness two-way capital flows, i.e.,
the inflow of financial capital and the outflow of FDI; countries with intermediate
level of financial development have the outflow of financial capital and the inflow of
FDI. It is consistent with the fact that FDI flows not to the poorest countries but
to the middle-income countries.
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1 Introduction
We address two questions on international capital flows in a general equilibrium model
with financial frictions. How does domestic financial development affect the respective
returns on internal and external capital? How does the difference in the domestic financial
development of two countries affect the direction and the magnitude of international flows
of financial capital and foreign direct investment (FDI, henceforth) under different capital
controls?
According to the classic trade theory, the cross-country difference in factor endowment
result in the relative price differential which then gives rise to international trade. The
degree of financial development can also be considered as an endowment for an economy
as a whole in the short run.1 Our paper shows that financial development determines the
rates of return on external capital (loan) and internal capital (equity). The cross-country
differences in the rates of return on two types of capital give rise to capital flows in two
forms: financial capital and FDI.
Most of the theoretical papers in the literature on international finance analyze inter-
national borrowing and lending in the form of financial capital. Lucas (1990) raises the
paradox that too less capital flows into developing economies. He argues that imperfect
international capital market (political risk) may explain such a paradox. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003) investigate the dynamic interactions between domestic and
international collateral constraints and show that limited financial development reduces
the incentives for foreign lenders to enter emerging markets. Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki
(2006) investigate how the adjustment to capital liberalization depends upon the domestic
and international collateral constraints. von Hagen and Zhang (2006, forthcoming) con-
sider the efficiency and welfare implications of capital inflows. These papers use a small
open economy model and financial capital flows are driven by the interest rate differential
between domestic and foreign funds.
FDI is usually analyzed from the perspective of industrial organization, and multi-
national firms stay in the center of the analysis. According to Blomstro¨m and Kokko
(2003), there has been a strong consensus in the literature about why multinationals in-
vest in specific locations (Dunning, 1993; Globerman and Shapiro, 1999). Multinational
corporations (MNCs) are mainly attracted by strong economic fundamentals in the host
economies. The most important of these are market size and the level of real income, with
skill levels in the host economy, the availability of infrastructure and other resources that
facilitate efficient specialization of production, trade policies, and political and macroe-
1Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Simeon Djankov and Shleifer (2006) show that the
efficiency of debt enforcement is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts
debt market development across countries.
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conomic stability as other central determinants.
Our paper focuses on the financial motives of FDI and analyzes the joint determi-
nation of cross-border flows of both financial capital and FDI in a general equilibrium
model. We are not the first to analyze the composition of international capital flows from
the perspective of financial development. Ju and Wei (2006) show that the cross-country
difference in financial development leads to a unique equilibrium of the outflow of financial
capital from and the inflow of FDI to the country with less developed financial system.
They argue that their model can explain the fact that net capital flows to less developed
economies are too small. Antras and Caballero (2007) focus on the relationship between
trade and capital flows. They show that in a world with heterogeneous financial develop-
ment, trade and capital mobility are complements in less financially developed economies.
In a dynamic framework, the complementarity carries over to financial capital flows. Such
an interaction implies that deepening trade integration in developing economies raises net
capital inflows. Antras and Caballero (2007) only analyze financial capital flows without
explicit analysis on FDI.
Normally, a unit of capital has different rates of return in the hand of different persons.
Those who have profitable projects become entrepreneurs. If their project has a higher rate
of return than the loan rate, entrepreneurs prefer to borrow as much as possible. However,
due to moral hazard problem, they cannot fully pledge the project outcomes to external
financiers. As a result, they are subject to borrowing constraints and have to put own
funds in the projects. The binding borrowing constraints for individual firms has a general
equilibrium effect on the loan rate, i.e., the insufficient effective credit demand keeps the
loan rate lower than the rate of return to equity (internal capital). In comparison with
external financier, entrepreneurs have the privilege owning and controlling the production
project which essentially gives rise to the spread between the rates of return on equity
and loan.
The strictness of the borrowing constraints depends not only on the characteristics
of the individual projects, but also on financial development in the economy. The same
project has a larger external value in the economy with better protection of creditors,
more efficient legal system, and more liquid asset market.
Intuitively, in the countries with more developed financial system, entrepreneurs can
pledge a larger fraction of their project outcomes for loans and thus, they can get more
external funds. In the case of international financial autarky, the loan rate is higher
because domestic saving is scarcer in comparison with the effective credit demand on
the aggregate level. So is the deposit rate. In this sense, financial development has an
unambiguous positive effect on the loan rate and the deposit rate.
However, financial development may have non-monotonic effect on the rate of return
on equity. First, it enables entrepreneurs to borrow more loans and expand their project
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investment. This way, financial development has a positive “scale” effect on equity return.
Second, it has a general equilibrium effect: financial development leads to an increasing
demand for credit and then the rise in the loan rate. This way, financial development has
a negative “cost” effect on equity return. As our first contribution, we show that the rate
of return on equity has a hump-shaped pattern with respect to financial development: it
initially rises and then declines in financial development.
We then analyze two types of capital flows in a general equilibrium two-country model.
The two countries differ in financial development. In the case of international financial
autarky, the rate of return on external capital (the loan rate) is surely higher in the
country with more developed financial system, while it may not be true for the rate of
return on internal capital, given its hump-shaped pattern to financial development.
Capital account liberalization leads to international factor movement: the outflow of
financial capital (bank loans) from the country with less developed financial system and
FDI into the country with the higher equity return. As our second contribution, we show
that the direction of FDI is not straightforward and depends on the exact levels of finan-
cial development in the two countries and specific capital controls policy. Note that FDI
is involved not only the flow of capital but, more importantly, the movement of profitable
projects. The redistribution of entrepreneurs in the two countries has asymmetric com-
petition effect on two credit markets and the output gains in the country with FDI inflow
may not fully compensate the output loss in the country with FDI outflow. Surprisingly,
the world output may be lower in the case of free mobility of FDI than in the case of in-
ternational financial autarky. In this sense, given financial frictions, production efficiency
may be worsened with free movement of productive factors.
As our third contribution, we show that if the public regulator in the country with less
developed financial system lifts controls on FDI only, there may be FDI inflow. However,
additionally lifting controls on financial capital results in FDI outflows. In this sense, the
sequence of different deregulation policy may matter for the direction of capital flows as
well as aggregate domestic production.
The inflow of financial capital affects the credit supply while the inflow of equity
capital affects the credit demand. In this sense, different forms of capital inflows can have
opposite effects on the loan rate. Therefore, as our fourth contribution, we show that
lifting capital controls on equity capital and financial capital have opposite production
and welfare effect on both micro- and macro-level. In this sense, more attention should
be paid to the motives and effects of different types of capital flows on the micro level
instead of to aggregate capital flows on the macro level only.
Essentially, what matters in our model for the direction and the size of different types
of capital flows is not aggregate capital stock in the economy but who owns the capital
stock and how much. The ownership of capital stock matters not only for aggregate out-
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put but also the respective rates of return on different forms of capital. It is financial
underdevelopment that leads to the lack of the effective demand for credit and depresses
the domestic loan rate in the case of international financial autarky. Improving the do-
mestic financial system can affect the amount and direction of international capital flows
but it is a long-run issue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model
of a closed economy and analyzes how financial development affects the rates of return
on internal and external capital. Section 3 extends the basic model into a two-country
setting and discusses the welfare implications of international flows of two types of capital.
Section 4 concludes with some final remarks.
2 The Closed-Economy Model
Consider a two-period closed economy with two types of agents, entrepreneurs and house-
holds, with mass η and (1 − η), respectively. Each agent is endowed with one unit of
consumption goods in period 1. It takes one period for them to produce using their
respective projects. The consumption good is chosen as the numeraire. There is no ag-
gregate uncertainty in the model economy. Households and entrepreneurs have linear
preference over consumption in two periods, U = c1 + c2.
In equilibrium, the marginal product of the entrepreneurs’ project is larger than that of
the households’ project. Thus, entrepreneurs prefer to borrow from households. However,
households do not have the relevant monitoring technology and financial intermediaries
(banks) emerge as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984). In equilibrium, banks collect
deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. The efficiency of domestic legal and
financial system determines the fraction of the future project outcome that entrepreneurs
can pledge to banks for external financing. In other words, entrepreneurs are subject to
borrowing constraints.
Households invest i units of goods in their project and deposit d units of goods at the
banks in period 1. In period 2, the project of households yields G(i) = 2i− 0.5i2 units of
goods and the gross return on their deposits is rd. The production function of households
is chosen in such a way that the loan rate is strictly larger than unity in equilibrium. As
a result, both households and entrepreneurs prefer to postpone consumption to period 2.
Households maximize their period-2 consumption subject to the budget constraints,
max
i,d
c = G(i) + rd, (1)
i+ d = 1. (2)
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In equilibrium, the marginal product of their project is equal to the deposit rate,
G′(i) = 2− i = r. (3)
Entrepreneurs have linear production project, ye = Rie, where R > 1 implies that
their project is more productive than that of households in the case of autarky. They
finance the project investment ie using their endowment and bank loans ie = 1 + z in
period 1. The loan rate is also defined as the rate of return on external capital. Rie units
of goods are produced in period 2. After repaying rz to banks, entrepreneurs consume
ce in period 2. Let the rate of return on internal capital denote the rate of return on the
entrepreneurs’ endowment,
Γ ≡ Rie − r(ie − 1). (4)
In equilibrium, the rate of return on internal capital is no less than that on external
capital, Γ ≥ r; otherwise, entrepreneurs would deposit at the banks instead of borrow from
the banks. Entrepreneurs maximize their period-2 consumption subject to the period-2
budget constraint, borrowing constraints (6) and participation constraints (7):
max
ie
ce = Rie − r(ie − 1) (5)
r(ie − 1) ≤ θRie, (6)
Γ ≥ r ⇒ r = 2− i ≤ R. (7)
Following Matsuyama (2004, 2007, 2008), we use θ ∈ [0, 1] to measures the degree of
financial development in the economy. θ is higher in the country with more sophisticated
financial and legal system, better creditor protection, and etc.2 Note that only one of the
two constraints (6) and (7) is strictly binding in equilibrium.
Markets for consumption goods and credit clear in two periods,
ηz = (1− η)d, (8)
ηie + (1− η)i = 1, (9)
ηce + (1− η)c = ηRie + (1− η)(2i− 0.5i2). (10)
Definition 1. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {i, c, d}, en-
trepreneurs, {ie, ce, z}, together with the rates of return on external capital and internal
capital, {r,Γ}, satisfying equations (1)-(9).
2The pledgeability, θ, can be argued in various forms of agency costs story, e.g., the inalienability
of human capital of entrepreneurs by Hart and Moore (1994) or costly state verification by Townsend
(1979), or unobservable project (effort) choices by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). See Tirole (2006)
for a comprehensive overview of different models of financial contracting. Here, we focus more on the
implications of legal and financial development on the borrowing constraints of individuals. What matters
here is the borrowing constraints that restrict the project investment of the more productive agents. As
a result, we choose the simplest form of borrowing constraints.
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Lemma 1. For R ∈ (1, 2], there exists θU ≡ 1x
R−1+1
∈ (0, 1), where x ≡ η
1−η , such that
for any θ ∈ [θU , 1], the loan rate is constant at r = R and the project investments of
households and entrepreneurs are constant at i = 2 − R and ie = R−1
x
+ 1, respectively.
For θ ∈ (0, θU), the loan rate rises monotonically in θ; there exists θ∗ such that the rate
of return on internal capital reaches its global maximum at θ = θ∗.
For R > 2, there exists θU = 2(1−η)
R
∈ (0, 1) such that for any θ ∈ [θU , 1], the loan
rate is constant at r = 2 and the project investment of households and entrepreneurs is
constant at i = 0 and ie = 1
η
.
In the case of θ = 0, entrepreneurs cannot borrow and they invest all endowment
into their project. The rate of return on internal capital is simply the marginal product
of their project, Γ = R. For θ ∈ (θU , 1], the borrowing constraints of entrepreneurs are
slack because the rate of return on their internal capital is equal to the loan rate and the
marginal product of their project, Γ = r = R. Thus, economic allocation is unaffected by
further increase in θ.
For θ ∈ (0, θU ], the rate of return on internal capital of entrepreneurs exceeds that on
external capital, Γ(θ) > r. Entrepreneurs prefer to invest all their endowment into the
project and borrow to the limit. Due to the leverage effect, the rate of return on internal
capital is even higher than the marginal product of their project, Γ > R > r. Therefore,
we can shown that Γ′(θ = 0) > 0 and Γ′(θ = θU) < 0. It is obvious that there exist at
least a maximum for Γ. For θ ∈ (0, θU ], the following three equations hold,
ηie + (1− η)i = 1,
2− i = r,
r(ie − 1) = θRie.
Thus, we get ie by solving the following quadratic equation,
(xie + 1− x)(ie − 1) = θRie (11)
where x = η
1−η and 1 + x =
1
1−η .
ie =
√
(1− 2x− θR)2 + 4x(1− x)− (1− 2x− θR)
2x
(12)
In the case of binding borrowing constraints, i.e., θ ∈ [0, θU ], for each unit of project
output in period 2, an entrepreneur has to invest 1
R
in his project. By pledging a fraction
θ of the period-2 project output, the entrepreneur can borrow θ
r
to finance his project
investment and he only has to make the net investment of 1
R
− θ
r
. In period 2, after
paying θ to banks, the entrepreneur gets 1 − θ as net return. The rate of return on the
entrepreneurs’ internal capital can also be defined as
Γ ≡ 1− θ
1
R
− θ
r
. (13)
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Our qualitative results do not depend on the parameter values of R and η. We focus
on the case of R = 1.9 and η = 0.2 in the following analysis. Entrepreneurs account
for 20% of the population in the economy. Figure 1 shows how the degree of financial
development θ affects the respective rates of return on internal and external capital, the
consumption of households and entrepreneurs, and aggregate output. The horizontal axis
denotes θ ∈ [0, 1].
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0
2
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  Project Investment  
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Output and Consumption
c
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Y
Γ
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ie
i
θUθ*
Figure 1: Allocation in the Case of Autarky: θ ∈ [0, 1]
As θ rises from 0 to θU , entrepreneurs can pledge an increasing fraction of their project
output to the banks. The rise in the demand for loans pushes up the loan rate. Due to
perfect competition, banks do not make profit. In equilibrium, the deposit rate is equal
to the loan rate. The rise in the deposit rate induces households to deposit more at the
banks and reduce investment in their own project. The flow of funds from the households’
sector to the entrepreneurs’ sector affects the rate of return on internal capital in two ways.
First, entrepreneurs can increase their investment scale which has the positive effect on
Γ = (1−θ)Rie; second, the rise in the loan rate implies that entrepreneurs have to pay the
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higher cost for external funds as they borrow more from the banks. The first is called the
investment scale effect and the second the cost effect. The hump-shaped pattern of the
rate of return on internal capital results from the interaction of these two effects. Given a
small initial value of θ ∈ [0, θ∗), the investment scale effect dominates the loan rate effect
for an increase in θ and Γ rises in θ. For a large initial value of θ ∈ (θ∗, θU), the loan rate
effect dominates the investment scale effect and Γ declines in θ.
3 A Two-Country Model
Suppose that the world consists of two countries, country H (Home) and country F (For-
eign). We follow the notation in section 2 and the variables in country j are denoted with
subscript j ∈ {H,F}. If the two countries have the same degree of financial development,
θH = θF , there is no capital flows between them even in the case of perfect capital mobility
and the world economy is simply the sum of two autarky economy. If the two countries
have the different degrees of domestic financial development, θH 6= θF , figure 1 shows that
the rates of return on internal (external) capital in the two countries may be different in
the case of international financial autarky. Without capital controls, financial capital may
flow to the country with the higher loan rate and entrepreneurs will move their projects
to the country with the higher equity return.
Let D∗ ∈ [η − 1, 1 − η] and ρ ∈ [−η, η] denote the outflows of financial capital and
entrepreneurs from country H. The negative values of D∗ and ρ represent the inflows of
financial capital and entrepreneurs into country H.
Three cases are analyzed in the following subsections: capital controls on FDI only
(ρ = 0), capital controls on financial capital only (D∗ = 0), and no capital controls at all.
3.1 Free Mobility of Financial Capital Only
As shown in figure 1, if two countries differ in the degree of financial development, e.g.,
θj ∈ (0, θU) and θj < θi, where i, j ∈ {H,F} and i 6= j, the loan rate in country i
is strictly higher than that in country j in the case of international financial autarky,
ri > rj. Suppose that the international flow of financial capital is allowed but FDI is not.
In equilibrium, capital flows lead to the equalization of the loan rate in the two countries,
as long as international capital flows do not fully exhaust deposits in one country, i.e.,
D∗ ∈ (η − 1, 1− η).3
3Given our parameterizations, we can show D∗ ∈ (η − 1, 1 − η) and no need to consider the corner
solution here.
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G′(iH) = rH = rF = G′(iH). (14)
The period-1 resource constraint for the two countries are
ηieH + (1− η)iH = 1−D∗, ηieF + (1− η)iF = 1 +D∗. (15)
The consumption of entrepreneurs and the period-2 resource constraints for the two coun-
tries are,
ceH = Ri
e
H − rH(ieH − 1) = ΓH , (16)
ceF = Ri
e
F − rF (ieF − 1) = ΓF , (17)
ηceH + (1− η)cH = ηRieH + (1− η)G(iH) + rFD∗, (18)
ηceF + (1− η)cF = ηRieF + (1− η)G(iF )− rFD∗. (19)
Entrepreneurs are subject to participation constraints and borrowing constraints in the
two countries,
rH(i
e
H − 1) ≤ θHRieH , (20)
rF (i
e
F − 1) ≤ θFRieF , (21)
rH ≤ R, (22)
rF ≤ R. (23)
Note that only one of the two equations (20) and (22) is strictly binding in equilibrium.
Similar claim applies to equations (21) and (23).
Definition 2. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {ij, cj}, en-
trepreneurs, {iej , cej}, capital flows, {D∗}, together with the rates of return on external
and internal capital, {rj,Γj} in country j ∈ {H,F}, satisfying equations (14)-(23).
We first analyze the allocation in the two-country model with θH = 0.3 and θF ∈ [0, 1].
Afterwards, we will analyze the allocation in the two-country model for the complete set
of parameter values in figure 4.
Lemma 2. Given θH ∈ [0, θU ], there exists θUF ≡ 1− 12[1−(1−η)(2−R)]
η
− 1
1−θH
∈ (θU , 1) such that
for θF ∈ (θUF , 1], the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints specified by equations (20) and
(21) are slack, the loan rate is constant at r = R, the project investments of households and
entrepreneurs are constant at iH = iF = 2−R, ieF = 11−θUF , and i
e
H =
1
1−θH , respectively.
We make comparative static analysis of the two-country model in the case of free
flow of financial capital. Given θH = 0.3, figure 2 shows the values of relevant variables
10
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Figure 2: Free Flow of Financial Capital: θH = 0.3
and figure 3 shows the percentage difference of these variables in comparison with the
corresponding case of international financial autarky. The horizontal axis denotes θF ∈
[0, 1]. For θF ∈ (θUF , 1], the borrowing constraints of entrepreneurs in country F are slack
and economic allocation is unaffected by any change in θF .
The following discussion focuses on the case of θF ∈ (0, θUF ]. Let us start from the
case of θF = θH = 0.3. The loan rate is same in the two countries in the case of financial
autarky. Therefore, there is no capital flows even if there is no capital controls. As the
financial system in country F becomes more developed, the loan rate is higher in country
F and households in country H prefer to make deposits abroad. According to figure 1, a
larger difference between θF and θH implies the larger interest rate differential between
the two countries in the case of international financial autarky. Thus, in the case of free
flow of financial capital, capital flow from country H to country F increases in θF , as
shown in the fourth panel of figure 2.
Due to capital outflow, the loan rate in country H converges upwards to the world
interest rate and it forces entrepreneurs to reduce their borrowing and project investment.
The decline in their leverage ratio leads to a decrease in the rate of return on their internal
capital, ΓH = (1 − θH)RieH . The increase in the deposit rate also induces households in
country H to invest less in their own project but deposit more. In the aggregate, capital
outflow results in the decline in aggregate output in country H.
From the welfare perspective, as the project return is the only income of entrepreneurs
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Figure 3: Free Flow of Financial Capital: θH = 0.3
in country H, their consumption declines in θF ; while households in country H have two
sources of income in period 2: project return and deposit return. The increase in their
deposit return overcompensates the decline in their project return. Overall, households in
country H consume more than in the case of international financial autarky. Social welfare
is defined as the weighted average of the consumption of entrepreneurs and households,
Ωj ≡ ηcej + (1 − η)cj, in country j ∈ {H,F}. As θF rises from 0.3 to θUF , the social
welfare in country H has a non-monotonic pattern. Intuitively, a slight increase in θF
from 0.3 has only a small positive effect on the loan rate in country H. The increase in
the deposit return of households in period 2 is also small. However, the increase in the
loan rate has a larger negative effect on the project investment and the rate of return
on internal capital of entrepreneurs. In sum, the social welfare in country H falls in θF .
For a higher initial value of θF , the interest rate differential between the two country in
the case of international financial autarky is larger. A further increase in θF has a much
stronger effect on the loan rate and thus the deposit return for households. Therefore,
the increase in the households’ income overcompensates the decline in the project return
of entrepreneurs. As a result, social welfare in country H rises in θF .
How do international capital flows affect the allocation and welfare in country F? The
inflow of cheap foreign funds reduces the loan rate in country F. Entrepreneurs expand
their project investment by borrowing at a lower rate, while households prefer to deposit
less but invest more in their own project. The first panel of figure 2 shows that the project
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investment of households in country F decreases in θF . It may be misleading. For the
comparative static analysis, we should compare the cases with and without capital flows
for the same θF . In other words, the reference point for the analysis is the corresponding
case of international financial autarky, as shown in figure 1.
As the fourth panel of figure 3 shows, for θF ∈ (θH , θUF ), the project investments of
households and entrepreneurs in country F are larger than their corresponding values
under international financial autarky and so is aggregate output in country F; the larger
θF is, the loan rate declines more and the difference in project investment between the
cases with and without capital flows is larger.4
From the welfare perspective, entrepreneurs in country F consume more than in the
case of international financial autarky, due to the increase in their project return. House-
holds have two income sources: project return and deposit returns. The inflow of cheap
foreign funds reduces the loan rate and crowds out the bank deposits of households in
country F. The increase in their project return cannot compensate the decline in their
deposit return. Thus, households consume less than under international financial autarky.
Social welfare in country F has a hump-shaped pattern mainly driven by the hump-shaped
pattern of the entrepreneurs’ consumption.
Consider the world as a whole. Capital flows improve production efficiency and the
increase in aggregate output in country F overcompensates the decline in aggregate output
in country H. Thus, the world output rises in θF . In the case of international financial
autarky, domestic consumption is equal to domestic output; while in the case of capital
flows, output and social welfare do not have to move together. As shown in figure 2,
although output in country H declines due to capital outflow, social welfare is strictly
higher than output, due to the interest payment from abroad.
In the case of θF ∈ (0, θH), households in country F make deposits abroad and the
analysis follows almost exactly as above. Note that capital flows improve production
efficiency in the world economy and the improvement increases strictly in the difference
in financial development in the two countries, |θF − θH |.
Now, we consider the allocation in the two-country model for the complete set of
parameter values of θH , θF ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 4 shows some threshold values. The horizontal
axis denotes θH and the vertical axis denotes θF .
In region A, both θH and θF are larger than θ
U ≡ 1x
R−1+1
defined in Lemma 1. In
this case, according to figure 1, production is efficient in both countries in the sense
4Note that there is a kink for the project investment of entrepreneurs at θU . In the case without (with)
capital flows, economic allocation is constant for θ ∈ (θU , 1] (θ ∈ (θUF , 1]). θUF > θU for any θH ∈ (0, θU ).
As shown in the first panel in figure 2, the project investment of entrepreneurs in country F rises in θF
for θF ∈ (θU , θUF ]. The project investment of households in country F declines in θF for θF ∈ (θU , θUF ] in
the case with capital flows, while it is constant in the case without capital flows.
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Figure 4: Free Flow of Financial Capital: Threshold Values
that marginal rates of return on the project of households and entrepreneurs are equal,
G′(ij) = R, where j ∈ {H,F}. As a result, the loan rate and the rate of return on the
internal capital (equity return) are equal, rH = rF = R; there is no capital flows between
the two countries, D∗ = 0, even if international flows of financial capital is allowed. The
curve splitting region B and E (B′ and E ′) specifies the relationship of the degrees of
financial development in the two countries,
θH
1− θH +
θF
1− θF =
2(R− 1)
x
. (24)
As mentioned in Lemma 2, given θH ∈ [0, θU), changes in θF ∈ (θUF , 1] or in region B do
not affect capital flows and economic allocation. Similarly, given θF ∈ [0, θU), changes in
θH in region B
′ do not affect capital flows and economic allocation, either.
As shown in figure 2, given θH ∈ [0, θU), an increase in θF ∈ (θH , θUF ) or in region
E leads to an increase in capital outflow from country H. The economic allocation for
parameter values in region E ′ is symmetric to that in region E.
Table 1 summarizes the sign and size of capital flows in the five regions.
where D∗max(θ) ≡ η
(
R−1
x
− θ
1−θ
)
> 0 for θ ∈ [0, θU).
Proposition 1. If international flows of financial capital are allowed but not FDI, finan-
cial capital (bank loans) monotonically flows to the country with higher degree of financial
development unless production is efficient in the two countries. The size of capital flows
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Table 1: Sign and Size of Financial Capital Flows
Region A B B′ E E ′
D∗ 0 D∗max(θH) −D∗max(θF ) (0, D∗max(θH)) (−D∗max(θF ), 0)
increases and production efficiency in the world economy improves monotonically in the
difference between the degrees of financial development in the two countries.
3.2 Free Mobility of Foreign Direct Investment Only
According to figure 1, the rate of return on internal capital has a non-monotonic pattern
with respect to the degree of financial development. If two countries differ in the degree
of financial development, e.g., θj ∈ (0, θU) and θj < θi, where i, j ∈ {H,F} and i 6= j, the
rate of return on internal capital may be different. Suppose that the international flow of
financial capital is allowed but FDI is not. In equilibrium, capital flows equalize the rate
of return on internal capital in the two countries, as long as entrepreneurs in one country
do not all move to the other country, i.e., ρ ∈ (−η, η).5
ΓH = ΓF . (25)
The equilibrium loan rates in the two countries are
G′(iH) = rH , G′(iF ) = rF . (26)
The period-1 resource constraint for the two countries are
(η − ρ)ieH + (1− η)iH = 1− ρ, (η + ρ)ieF + (1− η)iF = 1 + ρ. (27)
The consumption of entrepreneurs and the period-2 resource constraints for the two coun-
tries are,
ceH = Ri
e
H − rH(ieH − 1) = ΓH , (28)
ceF = Ri
e
F − rF (ieF − 1) = ΓF , (29)
(η − ρ)ceH + (1− η)cH = (η − ρ)RieH + (1− η)G(iH), (30)
(η + ρ)ceF + (1− η)cF = (η + ρ)RieF + (1− η)G(iF ). (31)
We assume that entrepreneurs who move their project abroad in period 1 will move back
their home country in period 2. Social welfare is calculated according to the nationality
principle, Ω = ηcej + (1− η)cj, where j ∈ {H,F}. Given free mobility of FDI, the rate of
5As shown later, if all entrepreneurs move to the other country, ρ ∈ {−η, η}, the rate of return on
internal capital may not be same in the two countries and the corner solution has to be considered.
15
return on internal funds is equal in the two countries and so is entrepreneurs’ consumption,
ceH = c
e
F . Therefore, the repatriation of entrepreneurs affects the welfare analysis.
Entrepreneurs are subject to participation constraints and borrowing constraints in
the two countries,
rH(i
e
H − 1) ≤ θHRieH , (32)
rF (i
e
F − 1) ≤ θFRieF , (33)
rH ≤ R, (34)
rF ≤ R. (35)
Definition 3. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {ij, cj}, en-
trepreneurs, {iej , cej}, capital flows, {ρ}, together with the rates of return on external and
internal capital, {rj,Γj} in country j ∈ {H,F}, satisfying equations (25)-(35).
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Figure 5: Free Flow of FDI: Threshold Values
For a complete understanding of the sign and size of FDI flows in the two-country
model, we identify three types of threshold values.Figure 5 shows some threshold values.
The horizontal axis denotes θH and the vertical axis denotes θF .
As mentioned in subsection 3.1, for the two parameters in region A, the equal rate of
return on internal capital in the two countries, ΓH = ΓF = R, implies zero FDI, ρ = 0.
In addition, for the parameter values on the 45◦ line, the two countries have same degree
of financial development and thus, there is no FDI flows, either.
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The curve splitting region B and E (B′ and E ′) specifies the relationship of θH and
θF ,
1− θH
θH
+
1− θF
θF
=
2x
(R− 1) . (36)
Similar as stated in Lemma 2, given θH , changes in θF in region B do not affect allocation
because production in both countries is efficient in the sense that the marginal products
of the projects of households and entrepreneurs are equal G′(iH) = G′(iF ) = R. The
project investment of households in the two countries is constant at iH = iF = 2 − R,
that of entrepreneurs in country H is 1
1−θH , FDI flow to country F is constant at ρ =
η
[
1− (R−1)
x
(1−θH)
θH
]
< 0, and the project investment of entrepreneurs in country F is
ieF =
1
1−θUF
, where θUF satisfies equation (36) for given θH .
The curve splitting region E and J (E ′ and J ′) specifies the relationship of θH and θF ,
(1− θH)ieH,Aut = (1− θF )ieF,Aut (37)
where iej,Aut denotes the project investment of entrepreneurs in country j ∈ {H,F} in the
case of financial autarky as specified in equation (12). For the parameter values on this
curve, the rate of return on the internal capital is same in both countries and thus, there
is no FDI flows, ρ = 0, although the two countries may differ significantly in the degree
of financial development. For the parameter values in region E, the rate of return on
internal capital in country H is larger than that in country F and thus, entrepreneurs in
country F move their project to country H, ρ ∈ (−η, 0); while for the parameter values in
region J , the opposite is true and FDI flows from country H to country F, ρ ∈ (0, η).
The curve splitting region J and L specifies the relationship of θH and θF as follows,
1− θH
1
R
− θH = ΓH = ΓF =
1− θF
1
R
− θF
rF
(38)
where rF = 2x(i
e
F − 1) + 1 and ieF =
√
(1−4x−θFR)2+8x(1−2x)−(1−4x−θFR)
4x
. For the parameter
values in region L, given θF , changes in θH do not affect the allocation in the two countries;
the rate of return on the internal capital in country F is higher than that in country H
even though all entrepreneurs move their project to country F, ρ = η.6 The curve splitting
region J ′ and L′ is indeed a symmetric case of that mentioned above and the only difference
is the change in the subscript.
Table 2 summarizes the sign and size of FDI flows in the nine regions, where ρmax(θ) ≡
min{η, η
[
(R−1)
x
(1−θ)
θ
− 1
]
}.
6Since no entrepreneur borrows and produces in country F, the loan rate in country F equals the
marginal rate of return on the households’ project, rH = G′(1) = 1. According to equation (13), the
underlying rate of return on internal capital in country H is ΓH = 1−θH1
R−θH
, which can be shown lower than
ΓF given the parameter values in region L.
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Table 2: Sign and Size of FDI
Region A B B′ E E ′ J J ′ L L′
ρ 0 −ρmax(θH) ρmax(θF ) (−η, 0) (0, η) (0, η) (−η, 0) η −η
In the following, we analyze the allocation in the two-country model with θH = 0.3
and θF ∈ [0, 1]. Given θH = 0.3, figure 6 show the values of relevant variables and figure 7
shows the percentage difference of these variables in comparison with the corresponding
case of the closed economy. The horizonal axis denotes θF ∈ [0, 1].
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Project Investment
0 0.5 1
1
1.5
2
2.5
 Rates of Return 
0 0.5 1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
      Output     
0 0.5 1
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
        FDI      
0 0.5 1
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
   Consumption   
0 0.5 1
1.65
1.7
1.75
1.8
1.85
1.9
1.95
2
  Social Welfare 
ρ
θH θ’θ*
ieF
ieH
iF
iH
ΓH
ΓF rF
rH
YW
YF
YH
ceH=c
e
F
cF
cH ΩH
ΩF
θL
Figure 6: Free Flow of FDI: θH = 0.3
Let us start from the case of θF = θH = 0.3. The rate of return on internal capital is
same in the two countries in the case of financial autarky. Therefore, there is no FDI flows
even if there is no capital controls on FDI. Given the hump-shaped pattern of the rate of
return on internal capital shown in figure 1, for any θH ∈ (0, θU), there exists θF ∈ (0, θU)
and θF 6= θH such that the rate of return on internal capital in the two countries is
same. Therefore, there could be no FDI even if the level of financial development differs
significantly in the two countries.
As the degree of financial development in country F rises slightly, the rate of return
on internal capital is higher there and entrepreneurs in country H prefer to move their
endowment and project abroad. According to figure 1, as long as θF ∈ (θH , θ∗), a larger
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Figure 7: Free Flow of FDI: θH = 0.3
difference between θF and θH widens the difference in the rate of return on internal
capital between the two countries in the case of international financial autarky. Thus,
capital outflow from country H is larger as θF rises. See the fourth panel of figure 6.
For θF ∈ (θ∗, θ′), entrepreneurs in country H still move to country F but at a smaller
magnitude, where θ′ is defined as the level of financial development in country F where
the rate of return on internal capital is equal to that of θH in the case of international
financial autarky.
For θF ∈ (θH , θ′), due to outflow of entrepreneurs, the effective credit demand of
entrepreneurs in country H is smaller than in the case of international financial autarky
and so is the loan rate. The entrepreneurs who stay in country H get cheaper credit and
their project investment rises, as shown in the first panel of figure 7. The decline in the loan
rate in country H induces households to deposit less but invest more in their own project,
given that they are not allowed to save abroad. Due to outflow of entrepreneurs, aggregate
output in country H is less than in the case of international financial autarky despite of
the increase in the per capita project investment of households and entrepreneurs.
For θF ∈ (θ′, 1), the rate of return on internal capital is lower in country F than in
country H. As a result, entrepreneurs in country F move their own funds and projects
to country H for a higher return. The inflow of FDI raises the credit demand in country
H and the loan rate rises. On the one hand, households reduce their project investment
but make more deposits at the banks. Entrepreneurs born in country H have to borrow
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at a higher rate and their project investment is smaller than in the case of international
financial autarky. As more entrepreneurs produce in country H, aggregate output is more
than in the case of international financial autarky, despite of a smaller per capita project
investment of households and entrepreneurs.
For θF ∈ (0, θH), the allocation is simply opposite to that in the case of θF ∈ (θH , θ∗),
i.e., entrepreneurs in country F move their project to country H for a higher rate of return
on internal capital. Note that there is a threshold value of θL below which all entrepreneurs
move from country F to country H. It corresponds to region L in figure 5. As shown in
the second panel in figure 6, the (underlying) rate of return on internal capital in country
F is smaller than that in country H which also justifies the claim mentioned above.7
Let us consider the welfare implication of free flow of FDI for country H. As the
only income of entrepreneurs, their project return is linear to their project investment,
ΓH = (1−θH)RieH . For θF ∈ (θH , θ′), entrepreneurs in country H benefit strictly from free
flow of FDI due to the investment scale effect. Households have two sources of income
in period 2: project return and deposit return. The decline in the loan rate and their
deposits lead to the fall in their deposit return and the increase in their project return
cannot fully compensate it. Overall, households in country H consume less than in the
case of international financial autarky. For θF ∈ (θ′, 1), inflow of foreign entrepreneurs
has negative scale effect on the project of entrepreneurs and they consume less than under
international financial autarky. In contrast, households benefit from the higher deposit
return and their overall consumption is also higher. As the consumption variation of
entrepreneurs is much larger than that of households, social welfare in country H has a
hump-shaped pattern similar as that of entrepreneurs’ consumption.
How does free flow of FDI affect economic allocation and welfare in country F? For
θF ∈ (θH , θ′), entrepreneurs move their endowment and project to country F because of
larger pledgeable project outcome (θF > θH) despite of a higher loan rate (rF > rH). The
inflow of FDI raises the effective credit demand in country F and the loan rate is higher
than under international financial autarky, as shown in the fifth panel of figure 7. The
rise in the loan rate has negative scale effect on their project investment and the rate
of return on internal capital. Households prefer to make more deposit and invest less in
their project. As more entrepreneurs produce in country F, aggregate output in country
F is higher than under international financial autarky despite of the smaller per capita
project investment of households and entrepreneurs.
For θF ∈ (θ′, 1), the loan rate is so high that dominates the scale effect of θ. As a
result, entrepreneurs move out of country F. The decline in the effective loan demand
reduces the loan rate. On the one hand, households reduce their deposits and invest more
7In this case, the consumption of entrepreneurs in country F is different from the rate of return on
internal capital in country F, ceF 6= ΓF , but equal to that in country H, ceF = ceH .
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in their own project; on the other hand, entrepreneurs who stay in country F can borrow
at a lower rate and the expansion of their project investment has a positive scale effect
on their equity return, as shown in the fifth panel in figure 7. The kink at θF = θ
U can be
explained in a similar way as in subsection 3.1. As less entrepreneurs produce in country F,
aggregate output in country F is lower than under international financial autarky despite
of the larger per capita project investment of households and entrepreneurs.
Let us consider the welfare implication of free flow of FDI for country F. For θF ∈
(θH , θ
′), households benefit from the higher loan rate due to the inflow of FDI. While the
competition of foreign entrepreneurs on the credit market in country F has a negative
welfare effect on local entrepreneurs. For θF ∈ (θ′, 1), households lose from the lower loan
rate while entrepreneurs benefit. As the size of the consumption variation of entrepreneurs
dominates that of households, social welfare in country F mainly follows the consumption
pattern of entrepreneurs.
Consider the world as a whole. In contrast to the case of free flow of financial capital
in subsection 3.1, world output is surprisingly lower in the case of free flow of FDI than
in the case of international financial autarky for θF ∈ (θH , θ′). It implies that allowing in-
tertemporal trade (in the form of FDI) may not necessarily improve production efficiency.
Intuitively, the outflow of entrepreneurs from country H to country F has two opposite
effects on aggregate output in country H: fewer entrepreneurs producing in country H
and higher per capita project investment of local individuals. The first effect dominates
the second effect and aggregate output in country H is smaller. The inflow of FDI also
has two opposite effect on aggregate output in country F: more entrepreneurs producing
and lower per capita project investment of entrepreneurs. The first effect dominates the
second effect and aggregate output in country F is larger. Intuitively, FDI reduces the
mass of entrepreneurs in country H and raises the mass of entrepreneurs in country F.
Although the total mass of entrepreneurs is unchanged from the world perspective, the
distribution of entrepreneurs has asymmetric competition effect on the credit market in
the two countries. For θF = θ
∗, the loan rate declines in country H by 3%, while the
loan rate rises in country F by 3.4%. These also reflect the competition pressure on the
two credit markets. In sum, the output gains in country F cannot fully compensate the
output loss in country H. As a result, the world output is lower. This phenomenon exists
for θF ∈ (0.23, 0.65), given θH = 0.3.
In the case of international financial autarky, domestic consumption is equal to domes-
tic output; while in the case of free flow of FDI, output and social welfare do not move
together. As shown in figure 6, although output in country H declines due to capital
outflow for θF ∈ (θH , θ′), social welfare is strictly higher than in the case of international
financial autarky, due to the repatriation of entrepreneurs from abroad.
Comparing figures 3 and 7, we find that lifting controls on different forms of capital
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flows may have different welfare effects. For example, if θF is slightly higher than θH = 0.3,
allowing free flow of financial capital reduces social welfare in country H and improve
social welfare in country F, while we get the opposite result by allowing free flow of FDI.
Intuitively, lifting controls on different forms of capital flows directly affect the financing
and investment decisions of different agents. In this sense, more attention should be paid
to the motive of different types of capital flows on the micro-level, before we discuss the
aggregate implications of capital account liberalization.
Proposition 2. If international flows of FDI are allowed but not financial capital, FDI
does not necessarily flow to the country with higher degree of financial development and
may lead to the deterioration of production efficiency in the world economy.
3.3 Perfect Capital Mobility
After analyzing economic allocation and welfare implication of different capital controls
policy in subsections 3.1 and 3.2, we consider the case of perfect capital mobility in this
subsection.
Perfect capital mobility tends to equalize the rate of return on external capital as
well as internal capital in the two countries. As long as −(1 − η) < D < (1 − η) and
−η < ρ < η, the rates of return to external capital (internal capital) are same in the two
countries,
rH = rF = r, ΓH = ΓF . (39)
The period-1 resource constraints and the entrepreneurs’ borrowing and participation
constraints in the two countries are
(η − ρ)(ieH − 1) = (1− η)(1− iH)−D∗, (2− iH)(ieH − 1) ≤ θHRieH , rH ≤ R (40)
(η + ρ)(ieF − 1) = (1− η)(1− iF ) +D∗, (2− iF )(ieF − 1) ≤ θFRieF , rF ≤ R. (41)
The consumption of entrepreneurs and the period-2 resource constraints for the two coun-
tries are,
ceH = Ri
e
H − rH(ieH − 1) = ΓH , (42)
ceF = Ri
e
F − rF (ieF − 1) = ΓF , (43)
(η − ρ)ceH + (1− η)cH = (η − ρ)RieH + (1− η)G(iH) + rD∗, (44)
(η + ρ)ceF + (1− η)cF = (η + ρ)RieF + (1− η)G(iF )− rD∗. (45)
Definition 4. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {ij, cj}, en-
trepreneurs, {iej , cej}, capital flows, {D∗, ρ}, together with the rates of return on external
and internal capital, {rj,Γj} in country j ∈ {H,F}, satisfying equations (39)-(45).
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If θH = θF , there is no capital flows between the two economies and the allocation in
the two-country model is simply the sum of two countries in autarky. If θH 6= θF , the
equilibrium solution implies that production is efficient in both countries,
iH = iF = 2−R, rH = rF = ΓH = ΓF = R (46)
ieH =
1
1− θH , ρ =
2(1− η)(R− 1)− η
(
θF
1−θF +
θH
1−θH
)
θF
1−θF −
θH
1−θH
, (47)
ieF =
1
1− θF , D =
(1− η)(R− 1)
(
θF
1−θF +
θH
1−θH
)
− 2η
(
θF
1−θF
θH
1−θH
)
θF
1−θF −
θH
1−θH
. (48)
For a complete understanding of the sign and size of capital flows in the two country-
model, we identify three types of threshold values. Figure 8 shows the threshold values.
The horizontal and vertical axes denote θH and θF , respectively.
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Figure 8: Perfect Capital Mobility: Threshold Values
As mentioned in subsection 3.1, for the two parameters in region A, the equal rate of
return on internal and external capital in the two countries, rH = ΓH = rF = ΓF = R,
implies no capital flows, ρ = 0. In addition, for the parameter values on the 45◦ line,
the two countries have same degree of financial development and thus, there is no capital
flows, either.
The curve splitting region B and E (B′ and E ′) specifies the relationship of θH and
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θF ,
1− θH
θH
+
1− θF
θF
=
2x
R− 1 . (49)
For the parameter values on this curve, the flows of financial capital are zero in equilibrium,
D∗ = 0. For the parameter values in region B (E), financial capital flows to country H
(F).
The curve splitting region E and J (E ′ and J ′) specifies the relationship of θH and θF ,
θH
1− θH +
θF
1− θF =
2(R− 1)
x
. (50)
For the parameter values on this curve, the flows of FDI are zero in equilibrium, ρ = 0.
For the parameter values in region E (J), financial capital flows to country H (F), ρ < 0
(ρ > 0).
The line splitting region E and J (E ′ and J ′) is θF = θU (θH = θU). For the parameter
values in region L, all entrepreneurs move their project to country F, ρ = η. The solution
mentioned in equations (46)-(48) does not apply for this case. However, the solution in
this case is rather simple. Since all entrepreneurs move to country F and the loan rate in
the two countries is same, the two-country model economy can be considered as a closed
economy with households and entrepreneurs, each of mass 2, and the degree of financial
development θF .
Table 3: Sign and Size of FDI and Financial Capital Flows
Region A B B′ E E ′ J J ′ L L′
ρ 0 − + − + + − η −η
D∗ 0 − + + − + − D∗aut(θF ) −D∗aut(θH)
Table 3 summarizes the sign and size of FDI and financial capital flows in the nine
regions, where D∗aut(θ) ≡ η[ieaut(θ)− 1]. ieaut(θ) denotes the entrepreneurs’ project invest-
ment in a closed economy with the degree of financial development θ, which is calculated
according to equation (12). Note that capital flows in regions B′, E ′, J ′, L′ are symmetric
but opposite cases of those in regions B, E, J , L, respectively.
In the following, we analyze the allocation in the two-country model with θH = 0.3
and θF ∈ [0, 1] under perfect capital mobility. Given θH = 0.3, figure 9 show the values
of relevant variables and figure 10 shows the percentage difference of these variables in
comparison with the corresponding case of the closed economy. The horizonal axis denotes
θF ∈ [0, 1].
Let us start from the case of θF = θH = 0.3. The rate of return on internal capital
is same in the two countries in the case of financial autarky. Therefore, there is no FDI
flows even in the case of perfect capital mobility.
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Figure 9: Perfect Capital Mobility: θH = 0.3
For θF ∈ [0, θH), the rates of return on internal and external capital are both lower in
country F than in country H in the case of financial autarky, according to figure 1. Thus,
perfect capital mobility results in the inflows of both FDI and financial capital to country
H. As mentioned in table 3, for the parameter values in region L′, all entrepreneurs move
from country F to country H. Intuitively, for θF < θH = 0.3, the loan rate is higher
in country H than in country F in the case of financial autarky. Perfect capital mobility
allows households in country F to make deposit abroad. On the one hand, capital outflows
reduce the credit supply in country F. The rise in the loan rate reduces the borrowing
capacity and the project investment of entrepreneurs. It tends to reduce the rate of return
on internal capital in country F. On the other hand, the inflow of cheap foreign funds
from country F tends to reduce the loan rate in country H, which has positive effect on
the rate of return on internal capital in country H. As a result, entrepreneurs in country
F prefer to move their project to country H. As shown in the second panel of figure 8,
the underlying rate of return on internal capital in country F is still lower than that in
country H even though all entrepreneurs move their projects to country H.
Perfect capital mobility does not affect the allocation in country H. In fact, what
matters for the allocation is the degree of financial development in country H in this case.
Given all entrepreneurs moving from country F to country H, the outflows of financial
capital from country F match exactly the credit demand of these entrepreneurs in country
H. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs who move their project to country H pledge a larger
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Figure 10: Perfect Capital Mobility: θH = 0.3
fraction of their project outcome for external financing of their project investment, while
the loan rate in country F matches upwards to that in country H. In this sense, both
households and entrepreneurs free ride on the higher degree of financial development in
country H.
For θF ∈ (θH , θU ], the allocation is opposite to that in the case of θF ∈ [0, θH). As
mentioned in section 2, the rate of return on internal capital, Γ = 1−θ1
R
− θ
r
, has the hump-
shaped pattern with respect to the degree of financial development due to two effects, the
scale effect and the cost effect. In the case of free mobility of financial capital, the loan
rate is same in the two countries. Without the cost effect, the rate of return on internal
capital is strictly higher in the country with a higher degree of financial development,
∂Γ
∂θ
= 1
r
− 1
R
> 0, where r ≤ R. As shown in the second panel of figure 2, the rate of
return on internal capital is strictly higher in country F than that in country H in the case
of free mobility of financial capital. Allowing additionally free mobility of FDI induces
entrepreneurs move to the country with a higher degree of financial development. Thus,
both FDI and financial capital flow to country F where financial development is higher.
As shown in the second panel of figure 8, the underlying rate of return on internal capital
in country H is still lower than that in country F even though all entrepreneurs move
their projects to country F.
Note that for θF ∈ (0, θU), the allocation in the two-country model resembles that
in the closed-economy model with θ = max{θH , θF} where production is not efficient in
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the sense that the marginal products of the projects of households and entrepreneurs are
different.
For θF ∈ (θU , 1], production is efficient and the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints
is slack in country F in the case of international financial autarky. In other words, en-
trepreneurs do not borrow to the limit at the prevailing loan rate. Consider first the case
of θF slightly larger than θ
U . Allowing free mobility of financial capital leads to capital
inflows into country F. The extra supply of credit tends to reduce the loan rate and in-
duces entrepreneurs to borrow more in country F. Allowing additionally free mobility of
FDI induces entrepreneurs in country H to move their projects to country F for higher
rate of return on internal capital.
As θF rises to unity, FDI flows to country F at a smaller size and even changes direction
for a very large θF . According to the solution in equations (46)-(48), for θH < θ
U < θF ,
production is efficient at both countries in the case of perfect capital mobility, iH = iF =
i = 2− R, and aggregate credit supply is constant at 2(1− η)(1− i) = 2(1− η)(R − 1).
While, the project investments of entrepreneurs in the two countries are ieH =
1
1−θH and
ieF =
1
1−θF ; the aggregate credit demand in the two countries is
(η − ρ)(ieH − 1) + (η + ρ)(ieF − 1) = (η − ρ)
1
1
θH
− 1 + (η + ρ)
1
1
θF
− 1 . (51)
Intuitively, the rise in θF towards unity raises the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs
in country F and tends to pushes up the loan rate there. As a result, less entrepreneurs
in country H move their projects to country F. For θF close to unity, entrepreneurs in
country F may move their project to country H in equilibrium. In that case, we can
observe the two-way capital flows: FDI flows to the country with lower degree of financial
development and financial capital flows in the opposite direction. In other words, we can
observe a small net capital flows with large gross capital flows in the different forms.
As mentioned in figure 8 and table 3, for the parameter values in region B, the loan
rate differential in the two countries is small and so is the incentive for households making
deposits abroad. Similar as the argument mentioned above, for θF close to unity, we can
observe that both FDI and financial capital flow to country H.
Let us first consider the welfare implications of perfect capital mobility for country
H. For θF ∈ [0, θH ], allowing perfect capital mobility does not affect the allocation and
the welfare of individual household and entrepreneur in country H. For θF ∈ (θH , θU ],
perfect capital mobility induces all entrepreneurs in country H to move their projects into
country F and households in country H to make deposits abroad. On the one hand, the
more developed financial system in country F enables entrepreneurs to borrow more but
at a higher loan rate than in country H. As θF approaches θ
U , the cost effect dominates
the scale effect, and the consumption of entrepreneurs from country H has a hump-shaped
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pattern with regards to θF . On the other hand, as θF rises, households in country H can
make more deposits both at home and abroad at a higher rate than in the case of financial
autarky. Despite of the decline in their project investment, the consumption of households
rises strictly in θF . The positive effect of perfect capital mobility on the households’
welfare strictly dominates its non-monotonic effect on the entrepreneurs’ welfare. Thus,
the overall welfare of country H rises in θF . For θF ∈ [θU , 1], the rates of return on internal
and external capital are both constant at rH = ΓH = R. Thus, changes in θF do not
further affect the welfare of households and entrepreneurs.
The welfare implication of perfect capital mobility for country F is almost the symmet-
ric but opposite case of that for country H. For θF ∈ [0, θH), perfect capital mobility im-
proves the welfare of households and entrepreneurs in country F. While for θF ∈ (θH , θU),
perfect capital mobility does not affect the allocation and the welfare of individual agents
in country F.
Consider the world as a whole. As shown in the ninth panel in figure 10, perfect
capital mobility improve the world production efficiency.
Comparing the fourth panels of figures 6 and 9, we can see that entrepreneurs from
country F move their projects to country H for θF ∈ (θ′, θU) in the case of free mobility of
FDI. Allowing additionally free mobility of financial capital reverses the direction of FDI,
i.e., FDI flows from country H to country F. From the welfare perspective, perfect capital
mobility improves the welfare of country H as a whole in comparison with the case of free
mobility of FDI only. While, from the production perspective, the reversal of FDI reduces
domestic production in country H. If a government in country H can levy tax on GDP
and make transfer to domestic agents, the government may prefer to encourage FDI but
impose capital controls on financial capital in order to maximize domestic production. In
this sense, we can rationalize certain capital controls policy in some developing economies.
Proposition 3. In most cases, both financial capital and FDI tend to flow to the coun-
try with higher degree of financial development. In some cases, there may exist two-way
capital flows, i.e., financial capital flows to the country with higher degree of financial
development, while FDI flows to the country with lower degree of financial development.
It is also possible that both financial capital and FDI flow to the country with lower de-
gree of financial development. Perfect capital mobility improves production efficiency in
comparison with the case of financial autarky. From a dynamic perspective, lifting capital
controls may change the direction of capital flows.
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4 Final Remarks
We develop a general equilibrium model with financial frictions in which equity and loans
have different rates of return. Financial development raises the loan rate but has a non-
monotone effect on equity return.
We then show in a two-country model that capital account liberalization leads to out-
flow of financial capital from the country with less developed financial system. However,
the direction of foreign direct investment (FDI, henceforth) is not straightforward and
depends on capital controls policy and the exact degrees of financial development in the
two countries. Lifting controls on different types of capital controls may have opposite
welfare effect on the macro-level as well as the micro-level in the two countries.
Interestingly, free flow of FDI changes the distribution of entrepreneurs in the two
country and has asymmetric competition effect on the credit markets in the two countries.
As a result, the world output may decrease. In this sense, allowing intertemporal trade
between two countries may not necessarily improve the world production efficiency.
According to our model, countries with least developed financial system witness out-
flow of both financial capital and FDI; countries with most developed financial system
may have two-way capital flows, i.e., the inflow of financial capital and the outflow of
FDI; countries with intermediate level of financial development have the inflows of both
financial capital and FDI. It is consistent with the fact that FDI flows not to the poorest
countries but to the middle-income countries. Developing countries with less developed
financial system may impose controls on financial capital flows and attract FDI inflows.
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